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From Merkel to Kramp-Karrenbauer: Can
German Christian Democracy Reinvent Itself?
J €ORG MICHAEL DOSTAL
Abstract
Germany’s Christian Democrats have started preparing for the time after Angela Merkel.
After ten years as German chancellor facing a weak opposition, Merkel unexpectedly split
the country in late 2015 and early 2016 because of her ‘open border’ policies that allowed
more than 1 million refugees and migrants to rapidly enter Germany. Her management of
the subsequent crisis was largely considered a failure and her party suffered a series of dra-
matic election defeats. Reacting to the negative electoral feedback, and in particular the
breakthrough of the rightist and anti-immigration Alternative for Germany (AfD), the Chris-
tian Democratic Union organised an intra-party contest to replace Merkel as party leader.
Three candidates with different political profiles, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, Friedrich
Merz and Jens Spahn, contested the election. By voting for Kramp-Karrenbauer, the CDU
membership voiced support for maintaining a large-scale political coalition based on efforts
to find compromises between different party wings and social and cultural interests.
Keywords: Angela Merkel, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, Christian Democratic Union
(CDU), Germany, Friedrich Merz, Jens Spahn
Introduction
IN THE twenty-first century, German politics
has been transformed. The German polity is
now characterised by deep cultural, social
and political divisions. Two chronic policy-
making conflicts have jointly undermined an
earlier more consensus-driven political cul-
ture. These are firstly the social welfare
retrenchments that were enacted between
2003 and 2005 by the then ‘red-green’ Social
Democratic and Green Party coalition gov-
ernment; and secondly the decision of Ger-
many’s Chancellor Angela Merkel (CDU) to
allow refugees and migrants to enter the
country in late 2015 and early 2016, which
resulted in the rapid influx of more than 1
million people from African and Asian
countries into Germany.
In the larger context of socio-economic
change and growing social inequality, these
two political cleavages have jointly under-
mined the electoral appeal of the traditional
German ‘catch-all’ or ‘people’s parties’, the
centre-right Christian Democrats (CDU/
CSU) and the centre-left Social Democrats
(SPD). In the last federal election of 2017, the
former achieved 32.9 per cent and the latter
20.5 per cent of the national vote, their sec-
ond-worst and worst result ever in the
history of the Federal Republic. Their subse-
quent reluctant forming of a ‘grand coalition’
government in March 2018 (the term appears
hardly appropriate any longer since both
parties barely assemble a majority in parlia-
ment) raises the question as to whether Ger-
many will follow most other EU countries in
experiencing an increasingly fragmented and
weak party system.
This article takes up the case of the German
Christian Democrats (CDU), still the largest
centre-right party in a core EU country, and
asks how it plans to reorganise its political
strategy in what will soon be the post-Merkel
era.1 In particular, how will the CDU manage
the transition away from Merkel to a new
party leadership and, directly related, how is
the party going to react to political challenges
from right-wing populists (the Alternative for
Germany (AfD) party), on the one hand, and
competing centrist political forces (the Greens
and the SPD) on the other?
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In what follows, Merkel’s successful polit-
ical past between 2005 and 2015 is briefly
sketched. Next, the two central German
political cleavages (welfare, and refugees
and migration) are examined in order to
provide some background to better under-
stand the behaviour of Merkel and her
party in recent times. Thirdly, Merkel’s refu-
gee and migration policies since September
2015 and the ensuing backlash are dis-
cussed. The fourth section examines how
the CDU reacted to Merkel’s decline in
popularity and how her resignation as
party leader was prepared. The fifth section
describes the subsequent contest, in early
December 2018, between centrist Annegret
Kramp-Karrenbauer and two more conser-
vative candidates, Friedrich Merz and Jens
Spahn. Finally, the conclusion analyses the
future political opportunity structure for the
CDU in Germany’s by now well-established
six party system: will the CDU be able to
reinvent itself under the new leadership of
Kramp-Karrenbauer?
Merkel’s successful past
(2005–2015)
For most of Merkel’s chancellorship since
2005, observers have argued that her leader-
ship pushed the CDU firmly to the centre
ground of German politics. During her time
in office, she was credited with taking over
many policies of her electoral competitors—
the SPD and the Greens, in particular—while
‘modernising’ her own party in parallel.
Crucially, when Merkel became chancellor in
2005, she abandoned the radical welfare
retrenchment of the previous SPD and Green
Party coalition government in favour of
a return to small-step and incremental poli-
cies. Her economic policies were centrist,
essentially going with the flow of events.
She abandoned ‘ideological neoliberalism’ in
favour of a more accommodating style,
which also included re-regulatory policies on
numerous occasions.
During her chancellorship, pensions were
at first retrenched. Later on, policy delibera-
tion started to focus on how to compensate
disadvantaged groups and some minor
countervailing measures were enacted. After
lengthy debate, a statutory minimum wage
was introduced in 2015. There were various
rounds of ‘rescuing’ public and private
banks and efforts to stabilise the euro cur-
rency zone, none of these measures being in
line with supply-side economics or neoliberal
doctrine. Going against the general pattern
of slow decision making, but not against the
general logic of her understanding of policy
making, Merkel moved quickly after the
Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan in 2011
to commit Germany to abandoning nuclear
energy at some future point. This new pol-
icy, the exact opposite of her previous
course, was subsequently termed ‘energy
transition’ (Energiewende). In order to estab-
lish her party, and herself, as the natural
centre of German politics, coalition with all
relevant competitors (namely the SPD, anti-
nuclear Greens and Liberals) had to be possi-
ble at any point. In a similar context, the
CDU’s profile on socio-cultural issues shifted
from conservative to liberal and progressive
values. In particular, the party accepted
same-sex partnerships, expansion of public
childcare, the ideal of dual earner house-
holds, and dual nationality and citizenship
offers for certain categories of migrants.
Before being taken up by the Merkel-CDU,
these policies had initially been advanced by
electoral competitors.
Analysts have therefore described Mer-
kel’s general approach between 2005 and
2015 as ‘calculated demobilisation’ based on
‘reduced party competition’ and an ‘elec-
toral campaigning avoidance strategy’.2
While conservative Merkel critics argued
that she had turned the CDU into an empty
shell devoid of any clear policy commit-
ments, her admirers instead praised her for-
mula for electoral success: occupying the
political centre ground by borrowing poli-
cies from centrist competitors, and policy
making based on consultation and incre-
mentalism. During her ‘grand coalitions’
with the SPD (2005–2009, 2013–2017, and
again since March 2018) and her single spell
as leader of a centre-right coalition with the
Liberals (FDP) between 2009 and 2013, Mer-
kel profited to a large extent from demobil-
ising mistakes of her coalition partners.
After each electoral cycle, Merkel’s political
partners suffered electoral defeat while her
CDU maintained the role of the natural
party of government.
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During the Merkel era, a general increase
in social inequality occurred. The working
and middle classes experienced stagnant or
declining wages, while deregulated service
work with low job security expanded.3
Between the 2005 and 2009 federal elections,
electoral participation declined by around 7
per cent—mostly demoralised former SPD
voters—before recovering in the 2017 elec-
tions when the AfD managed to mobilise
large numbers of former non-voters. More-
over, the share of the vote of ‘wing’ parties
opposing Merkel on the left and right side of
the political spectrum (the Left Party and the
AfD) expanded. Crucially, calculated demo-
bilisation during the Merkel chancellorship
had a strong social class dimension: voters
with lower socio-economic positions (un-
skilled and skilled blue collar workers and
the urban poor) have increasingly turned
away from participating in elections alto-
gether or, more recently, have switched to
vote for the rightist AfD party.4
While observers continue to disagree
about the exact ingredients of Merkel’s past
success formula, the date when her fortunes
turned will likely be agreed to have been the
3 September 2015. On this day, Merkel
decided to allow refugees and migrants
waiting in Hungary to enter Germany. Her
decision subsequently set in motion a large-
scale population movement of more than 1
million refugees and migrants into Germany
in late 2015 and early 2016. This policy deci-
sion immediately turned her from a repre-
sentative of consensus into the most
polarising politician in her own country and
far beyond.
Germany’s two chronic policy-
making conflicts
To begin with, the post-2003 welfare retrench-
ment and labour market deregulation (so-
called ‘Hartz reforms’), enacted under the for-
mer chancellor Gerhard Schr€oder (SPD), was
jointly passed in parliament by SPD, Greens
and the then CDU/CSU opposition. This
occurred at a moment in time when neoliberal
political ideas—deregulation, privatisation
and growing acceptance of social inequality—
had captured the imagination of Germany’s
political class. However, the Hartz reforms
between 2003 and 2005 represented the high-
est peak of the neoliberal wave in Germany
rather than a stable neoliberal hegemony. The
reforms triggered a dramatic backlash—the
largest anti-government street movement
since the unification of Germany in 1990.
Post-Hartz reform, the basis of the German
welfare state model, namely status protection
of skilled workers in a system of social insur-
ance, largely disappeared.
Instead, the German welfare state became
based on a much more limited concept of
social protection associated with liberal
rather than Bismarckian or social democratic
welfare policies. The dramatic cuts in social
security coverage, expansion of means-
testing principles in unemployment insur-
ance, pension retrenchment and deregulated
labour markets all resulted in growing
social inequality and a massive decline of
satisfaction with the political system. By
retrenching the welfare state, the SPD lead-
ers effectively demoralised their own elec-
torate. SPD voters were on average more
likely to rely on welfare state policies than
the economically better-off electorate of the
CDU/CSU. From the CDU’s political point
of view, letting the electoral competitors of
the SPD volunteer for the electoral costs of
welfare retrenchment was of course the
optimal outcome.
Yet this relative protection of the CDU/
CSU from electoral decline came to an end
in the autumn of 2015. In early September,
Chancellor Merkel took her lonely executive
decision, without consulting with the Ger-
man parliament or fellow EU member coun-
tries, to open Germany’s borders to refugees
and migrants who had entered the EU via
the Balkan route—often from Turkey—and
had assembled in the Hungarian capital of
Budapest. Initially, it was assumed that most
of the refugees and migrants were of Syrian
origin fleeing the war, and Merkel’s ‘human-
itarian’ decision received extensive support
from civil society representatives and the
media. However, public attitudes started to
shift following large-scale sexual assaults on
women in the German city of Cologne and
other places on New Year’s Eve 2016, in
which most perpetrators turned out to be
recent arrivals. Following these and other
crime incidents, a massive backlash occurred
that is still ongoing.
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Crucially, the reason for the deep split in
public attitudes with regard to refugees and
migrants goes beyond simple impression
management. In fact, the German public has
never engaged in an open debate of migra-
tion-related issues. Until the end of the twen-
tieth century, the Christian Democrats based
some of their electoral appeal on the state-
ment that ‘Germany is not a country of
immigration’. Historically, Germans used to
subscribe to a concept of ethnic nationalism,
which differs from notions of civic or repub-
lican nationalism along the lines of the US or
French model. However, Germany has since
the 1990s increasingly turned into a multi-
ethnic society. There have been major migra-
tion waves from Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union to Germany—in addi-
tion to earlier cohorts of migrants from Tur-
key and other southern countries. The share
of people in Germany with a ‘migration
background’ is now around one quarter of
the resident population. Some of them hold
dual citizenship—they were granted German
citizenship without resigning their original
one—while others do not. Crucially, younger
age cohorts among the German resident pop-
ulation include the by far highest migrant
(and Muslim-migrant) shares.
Thus, Merkel’s post-2015 refugee and
migration policies clashed with long-standing
cultural values and German anxieties, includ-
ing the observation that many German cities
have turned from predominantly ethnic Ger-
man into ethnically segregated cities over the
last generation or so. Ultimately, a combina-
tion of long-term and short-term factors, espe-
cially Merkel’s failure to communicate clearly
with the German public over her migration
policies, meant that confidence in Merkel’s
leadership was in the eyes of many observers
damaged beyond repair. Her near-complete
isolation on the issue in the EU context—Ger-
many’s decision was largely resented by
neighbouring EU countries—further under-
scored the poor impression. Ultimately, the
EU-Turkey agreement with Turkish President
Recep Tayyip Erdogan largely closed off
access to the ‘Balkan route’, thus limiting
the further arrival of migrants in Germany.
The agreement also included outsourcing
the protection of parts of the EU’s external
border to Turkey, in exchange for financial
contributions.
Merkel’s rapid domestic decline
since 2015
Merkel’s decision to allow the free entry of
refugees and migrants into Germany on 3
September 2015 was from the beginning
highly contested. Only three days later, the
then CSU party chairman and current Ger-
man interior minister Horst Seehofer criti-
cised the action, commenting that ‘Merkel’s
border opening is a major mistake that will
keep us busy for a long time’ and that ‘we
can only avoid a democratically legitimated
right wing if we take up worries and fears
in the population’.5 Such anxieties prepared
the stage for the subsequent decline in Mer-
kel’s standing and popularity. Her initial
political explanation was that Germany
opened its borders to grant shelter to refu-
gees from the Syrian war and from other
war zones in a ‘humanitarian gesture’. What
was surprising about this claim was that
Germany and the other EU countries had for
a long period failed to finance humanitarian
assistance for those Syrians who had left
their country for neighbouring states in the
Middle East and in Turkey. (The UN relief
effort had been underfunded and continues
to be underfunded today.)
Following the quick growth in the number
of refugees and migrants entering Germany,
a second explanation gained currency,
namely Germans were helping others in
order to prepare their own long-term eco-
nomic prosperity. This account stressed that
many of the refugees were ‘doctors and
nurses’ who, following their social integra-
tion into German society, would soon con-
tribute to the economic prosperity of their
host society. Some enthusiasts started to refer
to the newcomers as ‘the new Germans’.
Looking back, neither of these initial
explanations for Merkel’s policy-making
could be confirmed. Among the around one
million asylum seekers entering Germany
during the open border episode between
September 2015 and March 2016, around 70
per cent were young people, under the age
of thirty, and around two-thirds were male.
During 2016 and 2017, more than 1.2 million
asylum requests were received by the Ger-
man authorities, which included additional
people who had entered the country before
and after the open border episode or had
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travelled on other routes to reach Germany.
Less than a third of the people entering orig-
inated from Syria, while the remainder origi-
nated from a large number of African and
Asian countries. Around half of the new-
comers did not carry any identity papers
and subsequent practical experience sug-
gested that most of them would rely on the
German welfare state for a long period of
time.
Many critics of Merkel’s course suggested
that she had opened the gates for chaotic
mass migration, which in effect privileged
the most robust migrants and those paying
smugglers to enter the EU. Critics within the
CDU pointed out that the German state had
simply lost control and that the most basic
administrative procedures—such as keeping
track of the number of new arrivals—were
no longer being followed.6 In the smart
phone era, refugees and migrants could react
in real time to changes in the state’s policy
and administration, while the state could not
overcome the limitations of an analogue and
slow administrative process.
Refugee and migrant-related problems still
hold the highest salience of any political
issue in Germany. Longitudinal opinion
polls show that the topic ‘foreigners/integra-
tion/refugees’ has been considered the most
significant issue ever since September 2014
by a plurality and sometimes a majority of
respondents. For most of the time, the issue
was considered more significant than four
other topics (unemployment, economic
issues, education and pensions) combined.
Between August 2015 and February 2016,
more than 80 per cent of people considered
the topic the most important issue, while the
figure declined below 50 per cent in April
2017. Significantly, numbers quickly climbed
back up again between June and August
2018 when Merkel’s government signed the
‘UN Global Compact for Migration’ thereby
triggering a new round of domestic debates
and criticism. Other longitudinal opinion
polls suggest that the German public has
been evenly divided on whether Merkel was
doing a good or a bad job concerning refu-
gees and migration. Since October 2017,
however, a majority thought that she was
doing a bad job.7 Thus, the topic’s salience
continues to firmly dominate Germany’s
political agenda.
The CDU responds to Merkel’s
decline in popularity
Many observers of Merkel’s conduct since
2015 have criticised that she failed to com-
municate her policies in a transparent man-
ner. A typical voice in this respect was the
German singer Herbert Gr€onemeyer stating
that ‘I would hold against her that she sim-
ply does not communicate’.8 Some CDU par-
liamentarians also felt that Merkel had
stopped interactions with sections of the
party, disagreeing with her handling of the
crisis. To be fair, Merkel faced a Catch 22 sit-
uation. Especially in the former East Ger-
many, her decline in popularity was so
dramatic that attempts to communicate with
citizens became exercises in ridicule. In one
typical instance, Merkel attended a meeting
in the city of Chemnitz following the murder
of a German citizen by migrants. Her intro-
ductory remark that ‘I know that my pres-
ence is a provocation for some of you’
triggered the response: ‘When do you
resign?’
Since September 2015, the CDU has expe-
rienced dramatic defeats in all regional elec-
tions and the 2017 federal election with only
two exceptions (Saarland and North-Rhine
Westphalia). The rightist AfD managed to
enter each of Germany’s sixteen regional
parliaments, gaining around a quarter of
their support from former CDU/CSU voters,
while also collecting many votes from former
non-voters and from former Left Party sup-
porters, particularly in the former East Ger-
many. Following another dramatic electoral
defeat in the regional state of Hesse in Octo-
ber 2018 (the vote share of the CDU declined
from 38.3 per cent to 27 per cent), Merkel
announced her decision to resign as CDU
party leader and, more crucially, made it
known that her current term as chancellor
would be her last. Thus, she will retire as
chancellor in 2021 at the latest—even this
tenure is only secure if the current coalition
government manages to stay in office until
then.
Merkel’s decision reflected her loss of
authority in the party. Crucially, the unprece-
dented lengthy negotiations following the
2017 federal elections on forming a new
coalition government—first with Greens and
Liberals for three months, ending in failure;
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then with the SPD to agree yet another grand
coalition for lack of any alternative option—
made Merkel look weak as a national leader.
Critics observed that ‘the defence of power
by means of electoral success stands above
the internal conflict [within the CDU] over
concepts and policy content’ and that the
peaceful coexistence between mid-level party
bodies and the leadership ends ‘as soon as
leading representatives can no longer credi-
bly represent the promise to successfully
defend power’.9
In February 2018, Merkel still tried to lead
the renewal of her party when she pushed to
install Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer as the
new secretary general of the CDU. After
regaining the chancellorship in March 2018
—traditionally the major source of authority
within the CDU when in government—she
nevertheless suffered further decline of her
authority in party circles. Competing power
centres in the CDU, such as the parliamen-
tary group in the federal parliament, the
CDU regional prime ministers, and internal
party associations such as the employee
association (CDA), the economic council
(Wirtschaftsrat) and the mid-sized business
association (MIT), started to display more
autonomy from the chancellor.
In this context, a new round of internal
conflict within and between the two Chris-
tian Democratic parties (the CDU and the
CSU) concerning the unilateral rejection of
migrants at Germany’s borders in June 2018
was particularly damaging. This conflict was
the final call on CDU party bodies to act in
order to defend future electoral prospects. In
September 2018, CDU federal parliamentari-
ans unexpectedly rejected Merkel’s candidate
Volker Kauder as parliamentary leader in
favour of Ralph Brinkhaus, a CDU MP rep-
resenting moderate Merkel critics. The dra-
matic election defeat of the CDU in the
Hesse regional elections in the same month
meant that Merkel now faced decisive pres-
sure to ‘voluntarily’ resign her position as
party leader.
The future of the CDU: three
candidates, three scenarios
Replacing Merkel as CDU leader was an
effort to stop the party’s electoral decline. It
served as an important intermediate step to
prepare the post-Merkel period once she
leaves the chancellorship at the end of her
current term in 2021, or at an earlier point.
Within the CDU party hierarchy, her succes-
sor as party leader enjoys important agenda-
setting powers. Crucially, there exists a
convention in the CDU by which the party
leader has the first right to suggest the
party’s candidate for chancellor (self-nomina-
tion included). The three candidates compet-
ing for Merkel’s position as party leader
at a party conference in December 2018
were Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, Friedrich
Merz and Jens Spahn.
The three candidates were associated with
different wings and tendencies within the
CDU. Kramp-Karrenbauer, an economic cen-
trist with somewhat conservative social lean-
ings, was most closely associated with
Merkel and considered to be her preferred
candidate. Merz was on the contrary Mer-
kel’s bête noire in the sense that he had com-
peted with her for dominant influence in the
party in the early 2000s. Back then, he had
gained a reputation as a neoliberal purist
and advocate of large-scale deregulation of
the German economic model. In 2002, Mer-
kel made him leave his position as CDU lea-
der in the federal parliament in order to
allow her to take over his position. His unex-
pected return to become a candidate for the
CDU leadership in 2018 made him the
immediate favourite of CDU-associated busi-
ness circles. In contrast to Merz, Spahn as
Germany’s current health minister could be
described as a more flexible representative of
the conservative wing. He is sometimes asso-
ciated with the expansion of welfare state
activities in Germany’s rapidly aging society.
By the political standards of the CDU, he
was clearly the most radical choice in terms
of a political renewal of the party. Since each
of the three candidates stands for a particu-
lar vision of the future of Germany’s Chris-
tian Democrats, it is worth briefly portraying
them in turn.
Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer
Kramp-Karrenbauer, age fifty-six, originates
from Germany’s federal state of Saarland,
the smallest non-city state with a population
of less than 1 million people. After studying
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political and administrative sciences, she has
spent almost all her life as a professional
politician acting as a big fish in the small
pond of regional Saarland politics. She only
started to gain a national profile because of
her association with Merkel in recent years
and her subsequent election as CDU general
secretary during a party conference in Febru-
ary 2018. Kramp-Karrenbauer first entered
the Saarland parliament in 1999 and subse-
quently acted as minister with various port-
folios between 2000 and 2011.10 Between
2011 and February 2018, she was the regio-
nal prime minister (Ministerpr€asident) of the
Saarland.
During her political career, she led three
Saarland coalition governments, first briefly
with Greens and Liberals between 2011 and
2012, before switching to a grand coalition
with the SPD that was twice re-elected in
2012 and 2017. Crucially, Kramp-Karren-
bauer’s regional grand coalition differed
from Merkel’s grand coalition at the federal
level in the sense that the CDU maintained
high levels of support, receiving 40 per cent
of the votes in 2017, gaining 5 per cent,
which amounted to a singular success in an
otherwise depressing recent CDU election
record. A second contrast to Merkel’s style
of governing was that the Saar-SPD survived
the collaboration with the CDU in good
health receiving 30 per cent of the votes in
2017. Overall, Kramp-Karrenbauer’s policy
of compromise and collaboration with other
political parties derived from the political
culture of the post-industrial Saar region in
which strong state leadership was required
to restructure the economy from an earlier
dependency on coal mining and the steel
industry.
Over the years, Kramp-Karrenbauer
became associated with the social wing of
the CDU with regard to economic policies.
In Germany’s second federal parliamentary
branch of the regions (Bundesrat), she sup-
ported as Saar prime minister in 2012 and
2013 SPD plans for a fixed quota of women
on supervisory management boards and
SPD and Green Party suggestions to intro-
duce a statutory minimum wage and higher
taxes on high income earners. On socio-
cultural issues, Kramp-Karrenbauer voiced
in 2015 her opposition to the legal equalisa-
tion of homosexual with heterosexual
marriage, a measure that was enacted in
Germany in 2017. As a representative of the
socially conservative wing of her party,
Kramp-Karrenbauer stresses that she stands
by the social ideal of traditional families
(‘the traditional constellation of father,
mother and their biological children’) and of
associated tax and welfare policies.11
Friedrich Merz
Merz, age sixty-three, differed from the other
two candidates for the position of CDU lea-
der in the sense that his career as a profes-
sional politician appeared to have already
ended for good in 2009 when he left the fed-
eral parliament for a new career as a busi-
ness lawyer. After studying law, Merz had a
parliamentary career—first in the European
Parliament, between 1989 and 1994, and
then, between 1994 and 2009, in Germany’s
federal parliament. Throughout his political
life, Merz was almost exclusively associated
with business interests, acting as the leading
advocate of the CDU’s neoliberal turn. In the
early 2000s he gained country-wide fame for
his proposal to simplify radically the Ger-
man tax system. His plan is still remembered
as the ‘beer mat’ style of tax declaration, but
left no subsequent political impact. When
Merkel became chancellor in 2005, Merz was
not offered a ministerial appointment. Subse-
quently, he shifted his portfolio of activities
toward the business sector becoming first a
lawyer with an international law firm in
2005 and then, in 2009, the chairman of the
Atlantik-Br€ucke, Germany’s most senior
transatlantic network in which politicians
and company executives rub shoulders with
equivalent US leaders. In February 2016,
Merz became one of three supervisory board
chairmen of BlackRock Germany, the biggest
US investment fund with many investments
in German-based major corporations.
One of the consistencies of Merz’ political
life was his habit to act as a contrarian with
a poor sense of timing. His strong self-
confidence as one of Germany’s leading
pro-business representatives resulted in his
publication, in 2008, of a monograph titled
Let us Dare more Capitalism. The book
restated principles of German-style ordolib-
eralism, suggesting that capitalism could
gain more public support by turning
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employees into stock market investors and
shareholders in their own enterprise in order
to ‘overcome class differences that have only
been kept alive artificially for a long time’.12
However, his book was remarkably silent
about the origins of the then ongoing global
financial crisis, notably insufficient public
regulation of the banking sector. He there-
fore failed to catch the public mood at the
time.
His unexpected return into politics in
2018, campaigning to become Merkel’s
replacement as CDU party leader, triggered
an initial wave of goodwill, particularly
within his own party. Friendly media cover-
age described him as the ‘James Dean of
German politics’ who ‘died early enough to
become a hero’ (that is, had not been
involved with Merkel’s government).13 How-
ever, he once again failed to reach out to sec-
tors of the CDU beyond the market-liberal
wing. While promising to regain half of the
voters of the rightist AfD, he did not make
explicit how he intended to regain these vot-
ers beyond being critical of Merkel’s refugee
and migration policies. His only other nota-
ble policy suggestion was introducing a tax-
free allowance for private stock market
investments.
As head of BlackRock Germany and an
income millionaire, he involuntarily added
to the impression that he was out of touch
by claiming in an interview with a tabloid
newspaper to belong to the ‘upper middle
class’ rather than the ‘small very rich and
very wealthy upper class’.14 Subsequently,
some commentators took great pleasure in
pointing out to him that income millionaires
were statistically not part of Germany’s
‘middle class’. In summary, Merz failed to
reinvent himself as a politician able to reach
out to the general public.
Jens Spahn
As the youngest candidate by far, Spahn, at
thirty-eight, was from the beginning consid-
ered to be without any realistic prospect of
winning the contest. After joining the CDU
at fifteen, he became the youngest directly
elected member of Germany’s federal parlia-
ment at age twenty-two in 2002, and started
to focus on health policies. His subsequent
rapid political career included spells as lea-
der of the CDU’s working group on health
between 2009 and 2015 and as one of the
deputy leaders of the CDU/CSU parliamen-
tary group in 2013. He was then appointed
as a parliamentary state secretary in the min-
istry of economics in 2015. In March 2018,
Chancellor Merkel appointed him as Ger-
many’s minister of health. His short track
record in this role suggests that he plans to
gain a reputation as a mediator who can
deliver reforms based on consensus build-
ing.15 In this respect, Spahn differs from his
fellow conservative Merz.
Before and during his campaign to become
the new CDU leader, Spahn was the stron-
gest critic of Merkel’s refugee and migration
policies. He repeatedly voiced concern about
the illiberal attitudes of Muslim migrants in
Germany, describing migration as ‘the ele-
phant in the room’ and criticising those
who evaded discussing the issues and taking
difficult decisions.16
The decision about who would succeed
Merkel as party leader was taken at a party
conference in early December 2018. Spahn
had failed to attract much attention for his
candidacy since the media overwhelmingly
framed the contest as a two-horse race
between Kramp-Karrenbauer and Merz.
Kramp-Karrenbauer won the contest to
become the new CDU party leader in the
second round with around 52 per cent of
the party delegates’ vote, narrowly beating
Merz with around 48 per cent support.
Spahn as the third candidate achieved
around 15 per cent in the first round and
was dropped from the second ballot. His
voters evenly split up between the two
remaining candidates.
Conclusion: can German Christian
democracy reinvent itself?
There are two levels of analysis of the CDU’s
behaviour in recent times: the tactical and
the strategic level. Looking at short-term fac-
tors, the CDU has in recent months managed
to organise a textbook power transition
away from Merkel to Kramp-Karrenbauer.
By separating Merkel’s leadership of the
government as chancellor from the party
leadership and by offering the CDU
CAN GE RMAN CH R I S T I A N D EMO C R A C Y R E I N V E N T I T S E L F ? 293
© The Author 2019. The Political Quarterly © The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2019 The Political Quarterly, Vol. 90, No. 2
membership a choice between three candi-
dates with very different visions for the
party’s future, the party management is now
prepared for the time after Merkel.
There can be no reasonable doubt that
Kramp-Karrenbauer is the most promising
choice for the CDU’s immediate future. Her
political profile is much broader than that of
her two contenders—the unreconstructed
neoliberal Merz who had left frontbench poli-
tics for more than a decade and failed to
expand his appeal beyond pro-business cir-
cles, and the more conservative Spahn who
had campaigned on opposing Merkel’s refu-
gee and migration policies, that is, the most
painful subject that the party wished to leave
behind. As one observer has argued, the
choice of Kramp-Karrenbauer means that ‘the
planned neoliberal restructuring (Umcodier-
ung) of the CDU by Merz was avoided, and
the path of liberal modernisation will be
further followed’.17 Thus, a narrow majority
of CDU delegates voted for the candidate that
offered the relatively best prospects to
maintain the CDU as a broad political
coalition.
From a strategic point of view, however,
the future of the CDU remains in doubt. In
recent years, there has been a dramatic
increase in electoral volatility. The CDU as
the self-declared ‘party of the centre’ faces
the problem that the centre of society is
increasingly difficult to define: ‘The more the
bourgeoisie and bourgeois behaviour disap-
pear as social phenomena, the less powerful
centrist strategies of political parties
appear’.18 To be clear, the increasing elec-
toral volatility is due to the decline of social
integration in German society. One of the
major trends of twenty-first century Ger-
many has been the growing split between
winners and losers of modernisation. In the
context of a fragmented centre, petty bour-
geois milieus believe that their future social
standing is threatened. Crucially, the welfare
retrenchment of 2003 to 2005 (the ‘Hartz
reforms’) produced a first dealignment of a
cohort of petty bourgeois and blue collar
voters from the SPD and, less visibly, the
CDU/CSU. Some of these voters have re-
entered the electoral process in 2017 by vot-
ing for the AfD. In doing so, they were now
joined by a second dealignment: many for-
mer CDU/CSU and SPD voters—and in East
Germany former Left Party supporters—
switched to the AfD to voice their disagree-
ment with Merkel’s refugee and migration
policies, claiming that their own social inter-
ests had been ignored for too long.
It is significant to underline the close rela-
tionship between the ‘first’ (post-2005) and
the ‘second’ (post-2015) dealignment of for-
mer centrist voters from the centre-left and
the centre-right, respectively. These two elec-
toral shifts away from the centre are related
by the feeling that the future holds little
hope for those not able to compete in a
rapidly changing socio-cultural and socio-
economic environment with little promise of
welfare and security by the state. One French
observer puts it as follows: ‘The population
would not feel as threatened by the refugees
if the welfare state would not have been
retrenched. It is often said that people vote
for the AfD because they fear for their own
support by the welfare state. That one can
easily comprehend; after all their social
safety net was indeed massively cut down,
although not because of the refugees but
long beforehand by [SPD chancellor] Ger-
hard Schr€oder’.19
How is Kramp-Karrenbauer going to repo-
sition the CDU in a period of growing social
insecurity? In terms of addressing the vari-
ous urgent issues—refugees and migration,
social integration, economic policy-making—
she needs to keep the party united and able
to act. Her first high-profile activity as party
leader was organising a workshop in early
February 2019 with experts and practitioners,
and without Merkel in attendance, to draw
lessons from the post-2015 refugee and
migration policies. During this meeting,
Kramp-Karrenbauer acted as moderator
inviting others to voice grievances and pre-
sent ideas on how to rebuild political trust.
Nevertheless, this discussion converged on
what had already been debated for years:
cuts in welfare payments for migrants, more
repatriation of failed asylum seekers and
efforts to strengthen border security and
cooperation between EU countries. None of
this is going to produce quick results or sat-
isfy critics of Merkel’s track record.
As for the related issue of social integra-
tion, it is unclear how Kramp-Karrenbauer
intends to tackle the root causes of social cri-
sis, namely Germany’s dualistic labour
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market with many categories of working
poor, and the decline of trust in welfare state
institutions. Here, the CDU’s liberal wing
argues for a zero-sum choice between wel-
fare policies and tax cuts, favouring the lat-
ter. Kramp-Karrenbauer has already
signalled that she is willing to support CDU
liberals in demands to abolish the so-called
‘solidarity surcharge’ (Solidarit€atszuschlag), a
tax that was initially introduced after Ger-
many’s unification in 1990. The coalition
agreement between CDU/CSU and SPD of
March 2018 stated that this tax will be abol-
ished for the lower 90 per cent of income
earners during the current government. The
CDU now demands that it should also be
abolished for the top earners, which would
satisfy liberals but questions Kramp-Karren-
bauer’s commitment to the social wing of
her party.20 In short, she is subject to strong
and contradictory demands.
It is too early to tell whether Kramp-
Karrenbauer can protect and/or reinvent the
CDU as a political coalition. The rapid rise
of the AfD as a party combining national
conservative cadres, often with roots in the
pre-Merkel CDU, supported by uprooted
and disappointed voters from across the
political spectrum has demonstrated that
Germany’s party system is now in flux.
From the point of view of the CDU after
Merkel, how to deal with the difficult rela-
tionship between social and cultural integra-
tion under conditions of a structurally
weakened state after a generation of deregu-
lation and privatisation remains an open
question.
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